6
watered by the two head branches of the Shweli or Lung Chiang, locally known as the Ming Kwang and Ta T'ang Rivers respectively. Further north, beyond the headwaters of the Shweli, the country is not under China, but is inhabited by independent Kachins and Lisaws. Ta T'ang is the furthest point of Chinese jurisdiction north of Kai Ton, though I was informed that Chinese traders are settled in the Lisaw tracts still further north, and especially at a place called Langsu, three days from Kai Ton.
Moving east out of the Kai To'n Valley and the basin of the Shweli we pass the Ma Mien Kuan into the Salween system. Along this river the Chinese seem to be settled further north than was commonly supposed. They state that north of the great suspension bridge there is comparatively little malaria, and that Chinese can live near the river banks. The riparian population is, however, of a mixed character.
At the Salween we enter the country of the Tuan clan; this important Chinese family is descended from an ancestor who possessed himself of this part of the country, as I was informed, some seven or eight generations ago. It is now split into five branches; the head of each branch is a "tu'ssu," with his Chinese title and his appropriate position in the Chinese hierarchy of officials; the following is a list of the places of residence of these five brothers:-
Teng Keng, on the west bank of the Salween, about 30 miles, or two days' journey north of Meng-ku Ferry, .., in approximate latitude 25° 58′ north.
Mao Chao, on the west bank, two days further north, on about the same parallel as Tu Wo (see below).
Lu Ku, on the east bank, about 4 miles below Teng Keng.
Lao Wo, in the hills, a short day's journey to the north-east of Lu Ku.
Chiu Chou, on the west bank of the Mekong, 8 miles below Fei Lang Bridge, or approximate latitude 25° 45′ north.
The first two of the above five "tu'ssu" are subject to Yung Chang and the last three to the Sub-Prefect of Yun Lung and through him to Ta Li; Yun Lung City is one long stage east of the Mekong at Fei Lung Bridge.
Other "tu'ssu" on the Salween are Lien Ti, on the west bank, some 12 miles north of Meng Ku Ferry; this is a Chinese "tu'ssu" named Yang and Lu Chang, a small district between Teng Keng and Mao Chao, with, I believe, a Shan "tu'ssu" named "Cha." Lien Ti, Lu Chang, Teng Keng, and Mao Chao are all between the River Salween and east of the range on the west bank. This takes the Chinese up to about latitude 26° 10′ on the Salween, but north of that point the Salween Valley appears to be wholly out of control.
On the west bank of the Mekong, in about latitude 26° 10′, is an important "tu'ssu" named "Lo;" he is a Minchia and has an extensive strip of territory along both banks of the Mekong and over the hills to the east of it. He has also claims over the wild tribes of the Lou Tzu, who inhabit the great range between the Salween and the Mekong to the north of La ku, Lao Wo, and Tu Wo; but the Lou Tzu are far from recognizing his supremacy, and fighting of a kind is now proceeding.
Going north along the Mekong, beyond Su Wo, which is subject to Li Chiang, it appears that the whole of the east side of the river, but only the foot hills on the west bank, are under the ordinary jurisdiction of the Li Chiang Magistrate, or, further north, of the Wei Hsi Magistrate, but the upper slopes of the west bank range are under no sort of control; even on the east bank, near Wei Hsi itself, it is admitted that the control of the Mandarins over the Lamas and Thibetans is very slight. However, there is a small post of troops at Tse Ku, on the west bank near latitude 28° north, where there is a Catholic Mission, and the Wei Hsi Sub-Prefect has claims to the allegiance of several districts to the north and west of his city; as I did not visit Wei Hsi, but only heard of these claims from the Prefect of Li Chiang (Wei Hsi's official superior), I regret that I cannot give details.
Thus, Chinese jurisdiction may fairly be said to extend from Manung Pun in an easterly direction along the headwaters of the Shweli or Lung Chiang River; thence along the foot hills on the west bank of the Salween to about 26° 10° north latitude; thence east across the mountains by Lao Wo to Tu Wo, on the west bank of the Mekong, and thence north along the foot hills on the west bank of that river.
The disturbances which took place last year to the north of Tien Tang Kwan point to a pressure of Chinese population in a northerly direction beyond the headwaters of Shweli.
From the above remarks on the present administrative frontier of China, I would
7
beg permission to deduce the suggestion that a Boundary Commission of the same owing character as those which demarcated the south district would be out of place. Owing to the distance from the base, the extreme difficulty of the country, and the great likelihood of armed conflicts with Kachins and Lisaws, it will be hugely expensive, and, further, it is unlikely to be effective. On the other hand, I would point out that in the country to be dealt with there exists a series of boundaries, already marked out by Nature, and I would suggest that by negotiation one of these may be declared the boundary, and that then the question would be settled beyond the possibility of doubt, and without any expense at all.
Of such natural boundaries only two need, I think, be here considered. The first would give all that Burma would require or could fairly claim, and, if attainable, would be a satisfactory solution of the question. It would read somewhat as follows: "From Manung Pun, the most northerly point of the present frontier, the line will continue in a north-easterly direction, following the crest of the range forming the water-parting between the Taiping or Ta Ho and the Shweli or Lung Chiang on the Chinese side, and the Irrawaddy (N'Maikha branch) on the British side, until that range joins the main range forming the water-parting between the Irrawaddy and Salween Rivers. From this point the frontier will follow the crest of the latter range in a northerly direction to latitude ??"
This is in effect what the Government of Burma, on the strength of an arrangement between Sir Claude MacDonald and the Tsung-li Yamên in July 1898, now regards as the provisional frontier, but I would remark that the Chinese officials in Yunnan by no means recognize it as such. It is violated every season by Chinese, whose proceedings, it is true, are not formally authorized by the Yunnan Government, but whose presence on N'Maikha, will, when it comes to demarcation, infallibly be put forward as giving China a claim to that region. I am doubtful if the Yunnan local officials have ever really been informed of what Burma regards as the provisional boundary, or that any protest against the presence and proceedings of Chinese in the undelimited tracts has ever been notified to the Chinese officials.
The second boundary is the utmost I suppose that Burma could under any circumstances yield, i.e., the N'Maikha or east branch of the Irrawaddy and the frontier line would descend from Manung Pun to that river at a point to be agreed upon. Either of the above frontiers might be laid down by Treaty in Peking or London and the necessity of a Commission be obviated. Burma would then be able to proceed at leisure to extend her administration up to the line laid down.
Unless speedy and firm action is taken, serious difficulty is to be anticipated in securing Frontier No. 1, and it is to be expected that China will put forward claims far more than No. 2—in fact, that they will claim Kâhmti and want the boundary to be west of that valley.
There are, however, grave objections to granting the Chinese even as much as the N'Maikha (Frontier No. 2). The weight to be attached to these objections can be properly estimated only by the Burma officials, but I may point out that these objections are the following:---
(1.) Frontier No. 1 would give Burma practically all the Kachin country; it would therefore be a good ethnological line, which is a matter of some importance.
(2.) The Upper N'Maikha is not well known, and it might be hard to say which of many possible headwaters should be considered as the main river. Therefore Frontier No. 2 would leave the door open to future difficulties.
(3.) It is highly unlikely that any of the country on the east bank of the N'Maikha is suited for permanent occupation by Chinese peasantry. If it were, much of the objection to Frontier No. 2 would be removed, as Chinese peasants are good and peaceable neighbours; but as it is, if this strip of country is given to China, it is likely to become a jumping-off ground for raiders, filibusters, and smugglers, both Kachins and Chinese, who will be beyond the control of Burma, and render the work of administering the Trans-N'Maikha very difficult. It is safe to say that the Yunnan Government is too feeble and corrupt to undertake the efficient control of so difficult and distant a country.
Frontier No. 1 would do no real harm to China: no Chinese inhabited village would be given up—in fact, the less wild country is given to China the better, not only for her neighbours, but also for herself. The Chinese Government never really gets an administrative grip of any district where Chinese peasantry cannot settle. If, therefore, China is to come down to the N'Maikha, Burma must be prepared either to have her frontier repeatedly insulted, or to keep up an expensive line of posts along the N'Maikha. China, though diplomatically treated by us as a civilized Power, is not, in point of fact,
49
!
6
watered by the two head branches of the Shweli or Lung Chiang, locally known as the Ming Kwang and Ta T'ang Rivers respectively. Further north, beyond the headwaters of the Shweli, the country is not under China, but is inhabited by independent Kachins and Lisaws. Ta T'ang is the furthest point of Chinese jurisdiction north of Kai Ton, though I was informed that Chinese traders are settled in the Lisaw tracts still further north, and especially at a place called Langsu, three days from Kai Ton.
Moving east out of the Kai To'n Valley and the basin of the Shweli we pass the Ma Mien Kuau into the Salween system. Along this river the Chinese seem to be settled further north than was commonly supposed. They state that north of the great suspension bridge there is comparatively little malaria, and that Chinese can live near the river banks. The riparian population is, however, of a mixed character.
At the Salween we enter the country of the Tuan clan; this important Chines: family is descended from an ancestor who possessed himself of this part of the country, as I was informed, some seven or eight generations ago. It is now split into five branches; the head of each branch is a "tu'ssu," with his Chinese title and his appropriate position in the Chinese hierarchy of officials; the following is a list of the places of residence of these five brothers:-
Teng Keng, on the west bank of the Salween, about 30 miles, or two days' journey north of Meng-ku Ferry, .., in approximate latitude 25° 58 north.
Mao Chao, on the west bank, two days further north, on about the same
parallel as Tu Wo (see below).
Lu Ku, on the east bank, about 4 miles below Teng Keng.
Lao Wo, in the hills, a short day's journey to the north-east of Lu Ku. Chiu Chou, on the west bank of the Mekong, 8 miles below Fei Lang Bridge,
or approximate latitude 25° 45′ north,
The first two of the above five "tu'ssu"
are subject to Yung Chang and the last three to the Sub-Prefect of Yun Lung and through him to Ta Li; Yun Lung City is one long stage east of the Mekong at Fei Lung Bridge.
Other "tu'ssu 17 on the Salween are Lien Ti, on the west bank, some 12 miles north of Meng Ku Ferry; this is a Chinese "tu'ssu" named Yang and Lu Chang, a small district between Teng Keng and Mao Chao, with, I believe, a Shan "tu'ssu named "Cha." Lien Ti, Lu Chang, Teng Keng, and Mao Chao are all between the River Salween and east of the range on the west bank. This takes the Chinese up to about latitude 26° 10′ on the Salween, but north of that point the Salween Valley appears to be wholly out of control.
On the west bank of the Mekong, in about latitude 26° 10′, is an important "tu'ssu" named "Lo;" he is a Minchia and has an extensive strip of territory along both banks of the Mekong and over the hills to the east of it. He has also claims over the wild tribes of the Lou Tzu, who inhabit the great range between the Salween and the Mekong to the north of La ku, Lao Wo, and Tu Wo; but the Lou Tzu are far from recognizing his supremacy, and fighting of a kind is now proceeding.
Going north along the Mekong, beyond Su Wo, which is subject to Li Chiang, it appears that the whole of the east side of the river, but only the foot hills on the west bank, are under the ordinary jurisdiction of the Li Chiang Magistrate, or, further north, of the Wei Hsi Magistrate, but the upper slopes of the west bank range are under no sort of control; even on the east bank, near Wei Hsi itself, it is admitted that the control of the Mandarins over the Lamas and Thibetans is very slight. However, there is a small post of troops at Tse Ku, on the west bank near latitude 28° north, where there is a Catholic Mission, and the Wei Hsi Sub-Prefect has claims to the allegiance of several districts to the north and west of his city; as I did not visit Wei Hsi, but only heard of these claims from the Prefect of Li Chiang (Wei Hsi's official superior), I regret that I cannot give details.
Thus, Chinese jurisdiction may fairly be said to extend from Manung Pun in an easterly direction along the headwaters of the Shweli or Lung Chiang River; thence along the foot hills on the west bank of the Salween to about 26° 10° north latitude; thence east across the mountains by Lao Wo to Tu Wo, on the west bank of the Mekong, and thence north along the foot hills on the west bank of that river.
The disturbances which took place last year to the north of Tien Tang Kwan point to a pressure of Chinese population in a northerly direction beyond the headwaters of Shweli.
From the above remarks on the present administrative frontier of China, I would
7
beg permission to deduce the suggestion that a Boundary Commission of the same Owing character as those which demarcated the south district would be out of place. to the distance from the base, the extreme difficulty of the country, and the great likelihood of armed conflicts with Kachins and Lisaws, it will be hugely expensive, and, further, it is unlikely to be effective. On the other hand, I would point out that in the country to be dealt with there exists a series of boundaries, already marked out by Nature, and I would suggest that by negotiation one of these may be declared the boundary, and that then the question would be settled beyond the possibility of doubt, and without any expense at all.
Of such natural boundaries only two need, I think, be here considered. The first would give all that Burinah would require or could fairly claim, and, if attainable, would be a satisfactory solution of the question. It would read somewhat as follows: "From Manung Pun, the most northerly point of the present frontier, the line will continue in a north-easterly direction, following the crest of the range forming the water-parting between the Taiping or Ta Ho and the Shweli or Lung Chiang on the Chinese side, and the Irrawaddy (N'Maikha branch) on the British side, until that range joins the main range forming the water-parting between the Irrawaddy and Salween Rivers. From this point the frontier will follow the crest of the latter range in a northerly direction to latitude. ??"
This is in effect what the Government of Burmah, on the strength of an arrange- ment between Sir Claude MacDonald and the Tsung-li Yamên in July 1898, now regards as the provisional frontier, but I would remark that the Chinese officials in Yunnan by no means recognize it as such. It is violated every season by Chinese, whose proceedings, it is true, are not formally authorized by the Yunnan Government, but whose presence on N'Maikha, will, when it comes to demarcation, infallibly be put forward as giving China a claim to that region. I am doubtful if the Yunnan local officials have ever really been informed of what Burmah regards as the provisional boundary, or that any protest against the presence and proceedings of Chinese in the undelimited tracts has ever been notified to the Chinese officials.
The second boundary is the utmost I suppose that Burmah could under any circum- stances yield, ie, the N'Maikha or east branch of the Irrawaddy and the frontier line would descend from Manung Pun to that river at a point to be agreed upon. Either of the above frontiers might be laid down by Treaty in Peking or Loudon and the necessity of a Commission be obviated. Burmah would then be able to proceed at leisure to extend her administration up to the line laid down.
Unless speedy and firm action is taken, serious difficulty is to be anticipated in securing Frontier No. 1, and it is to be expected that China will put forward claims far more than No. 2-in fact, that they will claim Kâhmti and want the boundary to be west of that valley.
There are, however, grave objections to granting the Chinese even as much as the N'Maikha (Frontier No. 2). The weight to be attached to these objections can be properly estimated only by the Burial officials, but I may point out that these objections are the following:---
(1.) Frontier No. 1 would give Burmah practically all the Kachin country; it would therefore be a good ethnological line, which is a matter of some importance.
(2.) The Upper N'Maikha is not well known, and it might be hard to say which of many possible headwaters should be considered as the main river. Therefore Frontier No. 2 would leave the door open to future difficulties.
(3.) It is highly unlikely that any of the country on the east bank of the N'Maikha is suited for permanent occupation by Chinese peasantry. If it were, much of the objection to Frontier No. 2 would be removed, as Chinese peasants are good and peaceable neighbours; but as it is, if this strip of country is given to China, it is likely to become a jumping-off ground for raiders, filibusters, and smugglers, both Kachins and Chinese, who will be beyond the control of Burmah, and render the work of adininistering the Trans-N'Maikha very difficult. It is safe to say that the Yunnan Government is too feeble and corrupt to undertake the efficient control of so difficult
and distant a country.
Frontier No. 1 would do no real harm to China: no Chinese inhabited village would be given up-in fact, the less wild country is given to China the better, not only for her neighbours, but also for herself, The Chinese Government never really gets an administrative grip of any district where Chinese peasantry cannot settle. If, therefore, China is to come down to the N'Maikha, Burmah must be prepared either to have her frontier repeatedly insulted, or to keep up an expensive line of posts along the N'Maikha. China, though diplomatically treated by us as a civilized Power, is not, in point of fact,
49
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